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Abstract
Background Decision aids (DAs) are non-directive communication
tools that help patients make value-consistent health-care deci-
sions. However, most DAs have been developed without an expli-
cit theoretical framework, resulting in a lack of understanding of
how DAs achieve outcomes.
Objective To investigate the effect of promoting affective vs. delib-
erative processing on DA effectiveness based on dual-process
theory.
Design, setting and participants One hundred and forty-eight
female university students participated in a randomized controlled
experiment with three conditions: emotion-focused, information-
focused and control. Preference-value consistency, knowledge,
decisional conflict and satisfaction were compared across the con-
ditions using planned contrast analyses.
Intervention The intervention comprised two different DAs and
instructional manipulations. The emotion-focused condition
received a modified DA with affective content and instructions to
induce an affective reaction. The information-focused and control
conditions received the same DA without the affective content.
The information-focused condition received additional instructions
to induce deliberative processing.
Results Controlling for the experiment-wise error rate at
P < 0.017, the emotion-focused and information-focused condi-
tions had significantly higher decisional satisfaction than the con-
trol condition (P < 0.001). The emotion-focused condition did not
demonstrate preference-value consistency. There were no signifi-
cant differences for decisional conflict and knowledge.
Discussion Results suggest that the promotion of affective process-
ing may hinder value-consistent decision making, while deliberative
processing may enhance decisional satisfaction.
2742 ª 2014 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
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Conclusions This investigation of the effect of affective and delib-
erative processes in DA-supported decision making has implica-
tions for the design and use of DAs. DA effectiveness may be
enhanced by incorporating a simple instruction to focus on the
details of the information.
Introduction
Medical encounters often involve making mul-
tiple decisions about tests, treatments and pro-
cedures in which there is no single ‘best’ choice
(e.g.1). Guidelines from the International
Patient Decision Aid Standards (IPDAS) Col-
laboration define an optimal decision as one in
which the individual has greater knowledge of
the choice options and their features, greater
satisfaction with the decision, lower levels of
decisional conflict and greater decision-value
consistency.2,3 For patients to make an optimal
decision, they need to weigh up costs and bene-
fits associated with available options in consid-
eration of their values and specific needs.4
Making optimal health-care decisions is partic-
ularly difficult when the benefit–cost ratio of a
treatment option is small, where options pro-
duce similar survival but different quality of
life outcomes, or where there is no clear data
on outcomes.
Decision aids (DAs) have been developed to
assist patients in these situations. They are
non-directive tools designed to prepare patients
to make specific, deliberated choices consistent
with their own values.1 DAs present evidence-
based information on the options and out-
comes relevant to the patient’s health in a
clear, graphical way and commonly include
exercises to assist patients in clarifying their
values and weighing up the pros and cons.5 A
systematic review found that DAs improve
patients’ knowledge, reduce decisional conflict
and motivate people to take a more active role
in decision making.1 Therefore, they serve as a
valuable tool for enabling patients to engage in
shared decision making and make optimal deci-
sions about their health care.
To provide a standardized, evidence-based
framework for DA development, the IPDAS
Collaboration6 established a quality criteria for
DA development and evaluation. This provides
guidance for developers about using a system-
atic development process, what information to
provide, and how to present it. Even so, the
IPDAS quality criteria do not stipulate explicit
use of theory and the majority of DAs appear
to have been developed in the absence of an
explicit theoretical hypothesis about how
patients will reach decisions.7 As a conse-
quence, there is a lack of understanding of
how DAs affect outcomes.8 DAs demonstrate
different levels of effectiveness, but there has
been insufficient research investigating the
mechanisms responsible for this variability.7–10
Decision-making theories have the potential
to clarify this issue by providing explanations of
how people make choices and identifying the
factors that influence the decision-making pro-
cess.7 There is insufficient research to purport
the superiority of any particular decision-
making theory on which to base DAs; however,
expected utility theory has been the most widely
used approach informing DA developers of the
factors to consider, while dual-process theories
provide a potentially useful alternative perspec-
tive (see11,12). Dual-process theories acknowl-
edge both deliberative and affective processes as
integral to decision making.13 They acknowl-
edge the existence of two complementary sys-
tems – one logical, controlled, and analytical
and the other affect-based, automatic and intui-
tive – which operate in parallel with each other
in producing behaviour.13–15 These systems
have been referred to as the analytic and intui-
tive systems, respectively.13,14
The effectiveness of DAs has been explained
in terms of their influence on cognitive and emo-
tional processes, which are subsumed by the
analytic and intuitive systems, respectively.11,12
With regard to cognitive processes, DAs have
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been shown to encourage more systematic and
knowledgeable evaluations of the decision infor-
mation. These are thought to lead to more sta-
ble cognitions and thereby reduce decisional
conflict and increase satisfaction with the
decision.11,16,17
However, the mechanisms by which DAs
influence emotional processes and subsequent
outcomes are less clear. DAs have been associ-
ated with reducing feelings associated with deci-
sional conflict that impact adversely on decision
making.17 However, Bekker et al.11 suggest that
part of the effectiveness of DAs may result from
allowing the expression of decision-relevant feel-
ings that are not usually accessed in unaided
choices. They compared the content of usual
care vs. DA-supported consultations when peo-
ple were making decisions about prenatal diag-
nosis for emotional expression, information
seeking and evaluation of the information. Peo-
ple expressed more negative emotions, less posi-
tive emotions, more cognitive phrases and
thinking about the decision, and more positive
and negative evaluations of options in the DA
group than those receiving usual care. Informa-
tion seeking was equivalent across groups. At
the time of decision making, greater emotional
expression was associated with reduced reason-
ing, and greater decisional conflict and anxiety.
At 1-month follow-up, positive evaluations and
information seeking were associated with
increased decisional conflict, while positive eval-
uations were also associated with generation of
fewer reasons for their choice and negative eval-
uations were associated with lower anxiety. Par-
ticipants in the DA condition overall evaluated
more information and experienced a decrease in
decisional conflict over time, while the usual care
group’s decisional conflict scores increased.18
Thus, DAs appear to encourage greater use of
both affective and deliberative strategies, which
overall positively affected short- and long-term
evaluations of the decision outcome.
To date, most theoretical and empirical DA
research has focused on elucidating relevant
cognitive processes rather than examining emo-
tional influences.11 By adopting a dual-process
approach, the aim of the current study was to
clarify the role of emotional processes in DAs
by assessing the impact of promoting affective
vs. deliberative processing on DA effectiveness.
It is acknowledged that affective and delibera-
tive processing may not be considered as
functioning entirely separately, but rather in a
highly interdependent fashion (e.g.19). However,
it is a useful conceptualization in which to
undertake this exploratory research.
Decision aid effectiveness was considered in
terms of optimal decision making. Differences in
indicators of an optimal decision were compared
across three conditions distinguished by instruc-
tional manipulations to induce affective or
deliberative processing: emotion-focused vs.
information-focused vs. control. It was hypothe-
sized that the promotion of affective or
deliberative processing would influence decision-
making outcomes of knowledge of the options
and their features, decisional conflict, satisfac-
tion with the decision and preference-value con-
sistency. This was explored using a DA on
contraceptive methods developed specifically for
this study. This topic was chosen to ensure that
the subject matter would be meaningful to the
predominantly young female target population.
Method
Participants
One hundred and forty-eight female undergrad-
uate students from a large metropolitan univer-
sity in Sydney, Australia, participated in the
experiment. Participants were given course
credit for an introductory psychology course.
Design
A randomized experimental design was used
including three arms: emotion-focused,
information-focused or control condition. As
shown in Fig. 1, the groups differ by the DA
administered and instructional manipulations
adapted from previous research by Locken-
hoff et al.12,20 The emotion-focused group
received an emotion-enhanced DA-containing
modifications aimed at inducing affective
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reaction for the participants plus instructions
to focus on their emotional reactions to the
choice options; the information-focused group
received a standard DA plus instructions to
focus on the details of the information pre-
sented, while the control group received the
standard DA and no decision-making guidance,
thereby simulating natural processing (i.e. usual
care). The emotion-enhanced DA was developed
to improve upon the emotion-focused instruc-
tional manipulation in the studies by Locken-
hoff et al.,12,20 as the instructional manipulation
alone was not successful in eliciting a difference
in processing style compared with control.
Instructional manipulations
Before reading the DA, participants were asked
to think about: (i) their emotional reactions to
the information given in the DA (emotion-
focused condition) or (ii) the specific details/
facts of the information given in the DA
(information-focused condition). Two addi-
tional manipulations during and after reading
of the DA were used to reinforce the salience
of the initial instructions. Here, participants
rated: (i) the valence of their emotional feelings
about Depo-Provera and Mirena followed
by writing two emotional feelings they felt
about them (emotion-focused condition) or
(ii) how well they remembered the details of
Depo-Provera and Mirena followed by writ-
ing two facts they remembered about them
(information-focused condition).
Decision aids
The DAs were presented to participants on
paper.
1. The emotion DA (emotion-focused condi-
tion): This DA was identical to the standard
DA, with modifications aimed at inducing a
strong affective reaction for the participant.
These included emotional images, smiley
faces instead of systematic ovals in the icon
arrays as personlike figures have been shown
to be more evocative than bar graphs21;
handwriting font for the ‘I’ statements for
the summary of the pros and cons to facili-
tate understanding that the statements are
Figure 1 Study design.
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personally applicable and hence make the
information more concrete,22 and specific
colours shown to be mood arousing (i.e.
‘mood-lifting’).23 The first three modifica-
tions were targeted at enhancing the
vividness of the information.22
2. The standard DA (control and information-
focused conditions): This DA presented gen-
eral information on contraception followed by
more specific information, including the bene-
fits and risks/side-effects, on the contraceptive
options of Depo-Provera and Mirena.
Accompanying the text in black and white
was images of the contraceptives, explanatory
diagrams, including icon arrays consisting of
100 systematic ovals, and values clarification
exercises. These are key DA components.
Procedure
After providing informed consent, participants
were randomly allocated to one of the three
groups. They completed an electronic question-
naire immediately before and after reading the
DA and were debriefed after study completion.
Ethics approval was obtained from the univer-
sity Human Research Ethics Committee.
Measures
Based on IPDAS guidelines, an optimal deci-
sion in the current study was operationalized
as: greater knowledge of the options and their
features, greater satisfaction with the decision,
lower levels of decisional conflict and greater
preference-value consistency.2,3 Both the pre-
and post-intervention questionnaire assessed
mood, anxiety, personal values regarding con-
traceptives and preferences for the presented
contraceptive options. The pre-intervention
questionnaire assessed age, religion, ethnicity,
relationship status, contraceptive use and
familiarity with the presented contraceptive
options. The post-intervention questionnaire
included manipulation checks and assessed
contraceptive knowledge, satisfaction with
decision and decisional conflict. Figure 1 out-
lines the schedule of measures.
Affect measures included the validated 20-
item Positive and Negative Affect Schedule
(PANAS25). Anxiety was assessed using a six-
item short form of the State-Trait Anxiety
Inventory (STAI26).
Participants’ values were assessed by eight
items based on a scale by O’Connor.5 This
included factors relating to the risks/side-effects
and benefits of contraceptive use, and partici-
pants were asked to rate their personal impor-
tance, on a scale from 0 (not at all important)
to 10 (extremely important), where higher
scores indicate greater importance.
To assess participants’ preferences for the
contraceptive options, they were asked to rate
the strength of their preference separately for
Mirena and Depo-Provera contraceptive
methods, on a scale from 0 (do not prefer this
option) to 10 (strongly prefer this option). As in
this study, the decision between Depo-Provera
and Mirena was hypothetical for participants,
it was more appropriate to ask their preferences
than to make an actual choice.
Four items were used to check whether the
instructional manipulations worked. Partici-
pants were asked to rate, on a scale of 0 (not at
all) to 10 (extremely), the extent to which: (i)
they focused on the specific details/facts of the
DA booklet; (ii) they focused on their emotional
feelings about the options; (iii) they felt positive
and negative emotions; and (iv) the DA booklet
engaged their emotions. Higher scores indicate
higher levels of focus, emotional feeling or emo-
tional engagement. The first three items were
adapted from Mikels et al.12
Participants’ knowledge of the DA content,
including contraception in general and the
benefits and risks/side-effects of the specific
contraceptives, was assessed using 10 purpose-
designed true/false items. Higher total scores
indicated greater knowledge. The validated
Satisfaction With Decision (SWD16) scale was
used to assess participant’s satisfaction with
their decision. The validated Decisional Conflict
Scale (DCS17) was used to assess factors
related to uncertainty with decision making.
Total standardized scores of 25 or lower are
associated with follow-through with decisions,
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whereas scores that exceed 38 are associated
with delayed decision making.24
Statistical analysis
All statistical data analyses were conducted
using SPSS Inc. Released 2007. SPSS for
Windows, Version 16.0. Chicago, SPSS Inc. Dif-
ferences between conditions were assessed using
three planned contrasts, with coefficients 1 0 1,
0 1 1 and 1 1 0, respectively, for emotion-
focused, information-focused and control condi-
tions. As per O’Connor et al.,24 preference-
value consistency was assessed by comparing
the multiple correlation coefficients between
participants’ values and their preferences for
Depo-Provera and Mirena across conditions.
The experiment-wise error rate for the planned
contrast analyses was controlled at the 0.05 level
using the Bonferroni procedure, with a critical
value of F1,145 = 5.98 (or P < 0.017). For all
other analyses, a P-value of <0.05 was consid-
ered statistically significant.
Results
Demographic and health characteristics
One hundred and forty-eight women partici-
pated in the study (response rate 88.1%). The
sample characteristics are summarized in
Table 1, and there were no statistically signifi-
cant differences between the conditions.
Manipulation checks
The means of the manipulation checks scores
are displayed in Table 2. Planned contrast
analyses revealed little success in the instruc-
tional manipulations and emotion-focused DA
modifications. Only one significant difference
was found, indicating that participants in the
information-focused condition felt significantly
less negative emotion compared with partici-
pants in the emotion-focused condition. This
result, however, was not confirmed by the
negative affectivity subscale of the PANAS, as
indicated in the next paragraph.
Mood and anxiety
Mean differences in positive and negative affec-
tivity and anxiety from pre- to post-intervention
are shown in Table 3. There was a significant
decrease in positive affectivity (F1,145 = 31.47,
Table 1 Demographic characteristics and health information









Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD)
Age 19.59 (3.10) 20.37 (4.64) 19.94 (2.72)
Familiarity
Depo-Provera 0.43 (1.28) 0.75 (1.94) 0.19 (0.76)
Mirena 0.31 (0.90) 0.69 (2.12) 0.42 (1.50)
N (%) N (%) N (%)
Relationship status1
Single 26 (53) 27 (53) 17 (36)
Dating 23 (47) 21 (42) 31 (65)
Married/de
facto
0 (0) 3 (6) 0 (0)
Have had sexual intercourse
Yes 37 (76) 36 (71) 39 (81)
No 12 (26) 15 (29) 9 (19)
Contraceptives used2
Condoms 35 (71) 36 (71) 36 (75)
The pill/
Minipill
28 (57) 30 (59) 31 (65)




27 (55) 23 (48) 19 (40)
Christianity 18 (37) 22 (43) 23 (48)
Other 4 (8) 5 (10) 6 (12)
Country/region of birth3




6 (12) 5 (10) 4 (8)
Asia/Africa 8 (16) 13 (24) 11 (23)
Language other than English spoken at home
Yes 18 (37) 16 (31) 13 (27)
No 31 (63) 35 (69) 35 (73)
Familiarity (0–10).
1Chi-square analyses could not be performed, as the values did not
meet the minimum expected amount.
2Responses are only from participants who have had sexual
intercourse. Chi-square analyses could not be performed on the
‘Other’ option, as the values did not meet the minimum expected
amount.
3Chi-square analysis compared Australia and a grouped variable
containing the other categories, as the values did not meet the
minimum expected amount.
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P < 0.001) and increase in negative affectivity
(F1,145 = 5.91, P = 0.016) from pre- to post-
intervention across the whole sample. However,
there was no significant change in anxiety levels
from pre- to post-intervention, indicating that
the DA was not anxiety provoking. Planned
contrast analyses revealed no significant differ-
ences between conditions at pre- or post-inter-
vention, suggesting that the DA intervention
lowered participants’ mood regardless of
condition.
Decision-making outcomes
Mean knowledge, satisfaction and decisional
conflict scores across conditions are displayed in
Table 4. In the knowledge test, the average score
indicated good understanding of the DA.
Planned contrast analyses did not show any sig-
nificant differences between conditions on
knowledge.
Results of mean satisfaction with decision
revealed that participants were adequately sat-
isfied with their decision. Planned contrast
analyses showed that participants in the emo-
tion-focused and information-focused condi-
tions were more satisfied with their decision
than those in the control condition. No signif-
icant differences between the emotion-focused
and information-focused conditions were
detected.
Planned contrast analyses showed that
there were no significant differences between
conditions on total decisional conflict (or any
DCS Subscales). However, there were trends
for participants in the emotion-focused condi-
tion to show greater levels of total decisional
conflict compared with participants in the
control and information-focused conditions.
Participants in the emotion-focused condition
also showed a greater tendency to feel that
their decision was less in line with their val-
ues compared with participants in the control
condition.
Preference-value consistency was assessed by
comparing the multiple correlation coefficients
between participants’ values and their post-
preferences for Depo-Provera and Mirena
across conditions. As shown in Table 5, values
accounted for less variance in preferences for
both Depo-Provera and Mirena in the emo-
tion-focused condition compared with the
information-focused and control conditions,
with values explaining a significant amount of
variance only in the latter conditions. Thus,
the promotion of affective processing reduced
decision-value consistency.
Discussion
The aim of this study was to examine the
effect focused condition displayed lower
preference-value consistency and a tendency
for greater decisional conflict compared with
participants in the information-focused and
control conditions. In addition, participants in
the emotion-focused and information-focused
conditions showed higher levels of satisfaction
with decision than participants in the control





Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD)
Detail/fact focus 7.80 (2.14) 7.73 (1.77) 8.10 (2.01)
Emotional
feelings focus
5.59 (2.40) 5.22 (2.87) 5.50 (3.12)
DA emotional
engagement
5.80 (2.40) 5.43 (2.88) 5.54 (2.69)
Feel negative
emotion
6.39 (1.86)a 5.08 (2.88)a 5.71 (2.76)
Feel positive
emotion
4.53 (2.01) 3.63 (2.58) 4.35 (2.25)
Manipulation check (0–10).
Paired letters indicate a significant difference between groups,
controlling for the EER at P < 0.017.
Table 3 Mean differences on positive affectivity, negative
affectivity and anxiety from pre- to post-intervention
Emotion Information Control
Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD)
Positive
affectivity
2.80 (4.36) 1.77 (5.62) 2.32 (4.81)
Negative
affectivity
0.27 (3.23) 0.94 (3.82) 0.90 (3.40)
Anxiety 1.57 (8.66) 0.70 (3.49) 1.32 (9.80)
Positive and Negative Affectivity (10–50). Anxiety (20–80).
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condition. Participants in the emotion- and
information-focused conditions did not differ
significantly in levels of knowledge compared
with the control condition.
Preference-value consistency was lowest in
the emotion-focused condition. Participants’
values were not predictive of preferences for
Depo-Provera or Mirena, and participants
were less likely to feel that their preference was
in line with their values compared with the
information-focused and control conditions.
Participants in the emotion-focused condition
also showed a tendency to have greater levels of
decisional conflict compared with participants
in the control condition. The reason for these
results is unclear, yet they support the assertion
of Bekker et al.11 that an individual’s affective
reactions to the information in DAs may be a
key component in their decision making. Con-
sistent with the current study’s results, they
found that emotional expression was associated
with greater levels of decisional conflict immedi-
ately after using the DA and also at 1-month
follow-up. However, at follow-up, they found
that use of the DA overall resulted in lower lev-
els of decisional conflict and led participants to
reflect more on how the decision fit with their
values.18 Bekker et al.11 concluded that part of
the effectiveness of DAs is the way in which
they help individuals assimilate their affective
judgments in their decision making. In the cur-
rent study, we only assessed outcomes immedi-
ately post-decision-making so we are unable to
comment on the impact of the emotion-focused
DA in the longer term. It may be that both the
emotion-focused and information-focused con-
ditions need longer follow-up to show divergent
results. Nonetheless, the results warn against
encouraging a greater focus on emotional
feelings, as this appears to lead to at least a
short-term shift towards less consistency
between values and decision making.
Alternatively, it may be that the explicit focus
on affective reactions in the emotion-focused
condition caused participants to disregard their
preferences and values. Evidence suggests that
people do not use affect as information if its
relevance to the task is unclear,27 such as when
emotional feelings are attributed to a transient
external source.28 In the current study,
participants in the emotion-focused condition
may have attributed their feelings to the
manipulation and considered these instructions
Table 4 Means on knowledge, satisfaction and decisional conflict
Emotion Information Control
Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD)
Knowledge score 80.41 (13.84) 79.41 (14.06) 77.92 (13.99)
Satisfaction with decision (SWD) 3.65 (0.58)a 3.92 (0.63)b 2.95 (0.99)a,b
Decisional Conflict Scale (DCS) total 35.97 (14.51)c,d 29.04 (15.12)c 29.13 (13.78)d
Uncertainty subscale 47.45 (22.58) 38.24 (26.41) 38.72 (24.52)
Informed subscale 29.25 (15.32) 23.20 (13.05) 25.00 (17.02)
Values Clarity subscale 29.25 (19.92)e 25.49 (17.91) 20.83 (14.07)e
Support subscale 36.56 (21.64) 28.92 (19.46) 28.30 (17.84)
Effective decision subscale 36.99 (16.12) 29.29 (17.61) 31.90 (16.12)
Knowledge score calculated as percentage of items correct. Satisfaction with decision.1–5 DCS scores range from 0 (no decisional conflict) to
100 (extreme decisional conflict); scores of 37.5 or less are associated with making a decision, and scores of 25 or less are associated with
follow-through with decision.31
Paired letters indicate a significant difference between groups, controlling for the EER at P < 0.017.
Paired letters indicate a trend of P = 0.02 between groups, controlling for the EER at P < 0.017.




R2 F R2 F
Emotion-focused 0.08 0.49 0.28 1.91
Information-focused 0.32 2.51* 0.44 4.14**
Control 0.28 1.92 0.39 3.15**
*Significant at the 0.05 level.
**Significant at the 0.01 level.
ª 2014 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
Health Expectations, 18, pp.2742–2752
Decision aid effectiveness, E L Davis et al. 2749
as irrelevant to their preferences. This may in
turn explain why participants in the
emotion-focused condition also showed a
tendency to have greater levels of decisional con-
flict compared with participants in the control
condition.
Attributing the emotions they were experi-
encing to the manipulation could have caused
them to doubt their preferences and thereby
compromise certainty of their choice. Thus
overall, the results caution against an explicit
focus on emotional feelings in DA practice
until further investigation.
The finding that emotion-focused participants
showed greater levels of decisional conflict yet
also significantly greater levels of satisfaction
with the decision is of note. This finding
contradicts the notion that decisional conflict
and decisional satisfaction are influenced by sim-
ilar factors. Indeed both the information- and
emotion-focused arms showed greater decisional
satisfaction. It is possible that the instructional
manipulation in both conditions enhanced the
salience of making a decision with added consid-
eration of facts or emotions, leading these
participants to feel that they were being more
mindful of their decision regardless of how cer-
tain or content they were with that decision.
Thus, participants in the emotion-focused and
information-focused conditions may have felt
more satisfied with the decision-making process
compared with those in the control condition,
regardless of what they thought of their
decision. Future research comparing decision-
making outcomes from DA-supported decisions
in which individuals naturally range from highly
emotive to highly analytical may be helpful in
clarifying this issue.
It has been suggested that affective and delib-
erative styles of processing may enhance the
ability to acquire knowledge.29,30 However, in
the current study, it was found that levels of
knowledge in the emotion-focused and informa-
tion-focused conditions were not significantly
greater than the control condition. One impor-
tant point of difference in the current study,
however, is that affective and deliberative pro-
cessing were not examined in isolation, but
rather in the context of a DA-supported
decision. Thus, the finding may reflect the ability
of a DA to enhance knowledge very effectively.
Strengths & limitations
The study was the first to the authors’ knowl-
edge to experimentally assess the role of affec-
tive and deliberative processing in DA
effectiveness. The main strengths of the study
were the use of a theory-driven intervention and
a randomized experimental design. Through the
application of dual-process theory, the study
conducted was a theoretically driven investiga-
tion of the processes contributing to DA effec-
tiveness. There are also several limitations.
Firstly, the manipulation checks and mood
assessments indicated that the interventions
might not have been successful in promoting
affective and deliberative processing. This may
have been because the interventions were not
powerful enough to shift participants’ process-
ing, which has also been observed in previous
studies for the emotion-focused condition.12,20
It is also possible that the DAs induced robust
deliberative processing across all conditions, as
supported by the high self-reported focus on
details/ facts across all conditions. However, the
conditions showed some divergent outcomes
suggesting that processing was altered in some
way. Further research is needed to understand
how processing was affected in the different con-
ditions and how this impacts decision making.
Secondly, the modifications to the emotion-
focused DA introduced a confound, such that it
cannot be determined whether the observed
effects between groups were driven by differ-
ences between the standard and emotion-
focused DA or the instructional manipulations.
Finally, the generalizability of the findings is
limited by the use of a female university student
population and a hypothetical decision.
Future research
Further research is needed to investigate the
effects of deliberative and affective processing
on DA effectiveness in actual clinical decision-
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making settings and with a larger, more diverse
sample. More direct assessment of processing
style, such as process-tracing methods (e.g.
think-aloud protocol and eye tracking), may be
useful to understand the effects of this type of
intervention with greater clarity. It would also
be helpful to consider alternative ways of
investigating decision- or preference-value con-
sistency (e.g. purpose-designed items to assess
whether participants evaluated the information
in accord with their values).
Conclusions
This study used a theory-driven intervention to
investigate the effect of affective and deliberative
processes in DA-supported decision making,
with implications for the design and use of DAs.
The results suggest that at least in the short
term, the promotion of affective processing may
hinder value-consistent decision making, while
both affective and deliberative processing may
enhance satisfaction in decision making. Pend-
ing further investigation on the long-term effects
of promoting affective and deliberative process-
ing, it is tentatively suggested that the effective-
ness of DAs may be enhanced with respect to
satisfaction with decision by incorporating a
simple instruction to focus on the facts and
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